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The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
and Virtual Currency Regulation in the European Union 
 It cannot be disputed that globalizing forces have improved the speed and effectiveness 
with which money changes hands around the world. From more efficient wire transfers to real-
time currency conversions, technological advances have kept up with the needs of a busy global 
marketplace, offering no shortage of tools for individuals, corporations, and governments to 
direct funds from point A to point B. Although most exchanges of financial instruments are 
lawful, there remains a worrisome percentage of improper transactions facilitated by terrorist 
networks, organized crime conglomerates, and wealthy interests seeking to avoid tax burdens 
imposed by their home nations. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes estimates that 
the total amount of illegal money laundered (i.e., concealed by transfers involving foreign banks 
or legitimate businesses) in any given year is 2-5% of global GDP, or 2 trillion USD (UNODC, 
2019). Certainly the global economy is well served by an interconnected and efficient system for 
exchanging capital across borders, but the system has also become extremely complex, 
incorporating banking and non-bank interests that are equally equipped to issue money transfers. 
The diversity and scope of these financial intermediaries has made it more challenging for 
regulatory agencies to implement anti-money laundering (AML) policies and procedures capable 
of thwarting improper transactions. 
In recent years, the most disconcerting threat to AML initiatives worldwide has become 
the rise of virtual currencies. Defined as “a digital representation of value that is neither issued 
by a central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily attached to a fiat (conventional) currency, 
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but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of payment and can be transferred, stored 
or traded electronically,” virtual currencies have become synonymous with the democratization 
of global finance (Bajpai, 2019). The most notable virtual currencies are cryptocurrencies, digital 
assets that use encrypted algorithms for creating, transferring, and securing media of exchange. 
Virtual currencies are being created all the time, as these instruments do not require much more 
than a sufficiently powerful laptop for triggering the algorithms required for perpetual issuance 
(Ibid., 2019; Frankel, 2018). In fact, according to Investing.com, there are currently 2,644 
registered virtual currencies comprising nearly $275 billion in market capitalization alone 
(Investing.com, 2019). Moreover, Bitcoin and Ethereum – the two most popular cryptocurrencies 
in the market today – constitute 190 billion in market capitalization by themselves, a figure 
greater than the market capitalization of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley combined (Ibid., 
2019; Statista, 2019). In short, these financial instruments are becoming a force to be reckoned 
with in the global marketplace, yet they remain woefully unregulated even though recent reports 
suggest they have also been used to facilitate illicit money transfers (Kaminska, 2019).  
As one of the three most important regulatory regimes in the world (alongside the United 
States and China), the European Union (EU) has a vested interest in confronting any emergent 
threats to its governance (The New York Times, 2018). However, coordinating new initiatives 
among its 28 member states can be a challenging proposition, especially when faced with 
something as intentionally diffuse and swiftly evolving as money laundering networks supported 
by nascent technology. Nonetheless, the EU’s steadily-expanding mandate as the vanguard for 
advancing intra-European interests means that its approach to tackling this issue carries 
tremendous weight; after all, EU initiatives impact over 500 million people within its borders as 
well as those who interact with the bloc by other means (European Union, 2019). This paper 
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aims to assess the EU’s focus on virtual currency regulation as part of its general AML policy, 
starting with the European Banking Authority’s landmark opinion paper on virtual currencies 
and moving to the European Parliament and Council of the European Union’s 5th Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive, the primary mechanism placing virtual currencies squarely within its 
sights.   
I. Unpacking the European Union’s Focus on Virtual Currencies 
 On 4 July 2014, less than two years before the infamous “Panama Papers” leak served as 
a reminder of the strength of money laundering networks around the world, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) published a lengthy opinion paper on virtual currencies. In light of the 
sector’s relatively meager oversight and intentional evasion of centralized authority (including 
by governments), the growing proliferation of virtual currencies prompted the EBA to issue a 
public warning alerting consumers and relevant institutions of their risk (EBA, 2013). As part of 
its lengthy report, the EBA cited 70 risks related to virtual currencies, with their potential use in 
money laundering schemes constituting a primary concern (Ibid., 2013).  
Perhaps the most worrisome part of the report is that the very thing which makes virtual 
currencies so compelling – i.e., that they can be created by anyone at any time – also renders 
virtual currencies immensely difficult to monitor and track. As the EBA notes: 
“A VC scheme can be created, and then its function subsequently  
changed, by anyone, and in the case of decentralized schemes,  
such as Bitcoins, by anyone with a sufficient share of computational 
power; that payer and payee can remain anonymous; that VC schemes 
do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and may therefore undermine  
financial sanctions and seizure of assets; and … market participants  
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lack sound corporate governance arrangements” (Ibid., 2013). 
It was not until late 2013 that the EBA began to more actively monitor intra-EU virtual currency 
transactions, citing “a growing number of virtual currency schemes being launched, an 
increasing number of merchants, and a rising number of individuals using virtual currencies, 
[with] Bitcoins in particular” (Ibid., 2013). 
 Upon further analysis, the EBA identifies five areas in which the growth of virtual 
currencies presents a significant money laundering risk. The issue areas include: 
1) Criminals who are able to launder criminal proceeds because they can deposit and 
transfer virtual currencies anonymously (deemed a high priority risk because of the lack 
of personal identification in virtual currency exchanges and the absence of intermediary 
oversight);  
2) Criminals who are able to launder their proceeds because they can deposit and transfer 
virtual currencies globally, rapidly and irrevocably (deemed a high-priority risk because 
virtual currency schemes are not confined to jurisdictional borders, are hard to interpret, 
and are generally irreversible once executed);  
3) Criminals or terrorists who use virtual currency remittance systems and accounts for 
financing purposes (deemed a high priority risk for the same reasons provided under risk 
#2); 
4) Criminals or terrorists who disguise the origins of criminal proceeds, undermining the 
ability of enforcement authorities to obtain evidence and recover criminal assets (deemed 
a high-priority risk for the same reasons provided under risk #2); and 
5) Market participants who are controlled by criminals, terrorists or related organizations 
(deemed a high-priority risk for the same reasons provided under risk #2) (Ibid., 2013). 
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A recurring set of themes emerge when assessing the money laundering risks highlighted 
in the EBA’s report. First, anonymity presents the greatest challenge to any robust regulatory 
regime aimed at countering potential abuses within the virtual currency marketplace. Whereas 
illicit bank transfers or offshore accounts necessarily create a paper trail that can be retrieved and 
assessed by investigators, virtual currency transactions can be effectuated without a trace. 
Second, virtual currencies are now being used disguised as more common exchanges that muddle 
the ability to decipher whether the transaction in question is going to a legitimate entity or is 
instead an illicit transaction. For example, according to Jana Kasperkevic of Minnesota Public 
Radio’s Marketplace blog, immigrants sent 445 billion USD in remittances back to their home 
countries in 2016 (Kasperkevic, 2017). If even a fraction of those transactions are now being co-
opted by money laundering networks to evade detection, it poses a major problem for regulatory 
agencies seeking to differentiate between an already complex web of common transactions. 
Finally, even though there is a growing awareness of the risks of virtual currencies, there remains 
a veil surrounding who the primary virtual currency players are and how their goals may fuel 
money laundering activities (Newman, 2017). Virtual currency holders and creators are just as 
liable to use their holdings in order to transfer and store ill-gotten gains as they are to view them 
as part of a diversified and legally permissible investment portfolio, but tracking these 
individuals and intentions is nearly impossible unless they make themselves known. The unholy 
trinity of anonymity, mainstream mimicry, and muddled intent present a challenge unlike any 
other for contemporary regulatory agencies.   
 Although the EBA report offers a robust rendering of what virtual currencies are, how 
they work, and the danger they pose if left unchecked, most geographies have been slow to 
develop and adopt vigorous virtual currency regulation at the level of national AML policies. Per 
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a breakdown of current cryptocurrency regulations around the world as provided by CNBC in 
March 2018, it seems that political figures in major countries agree that virtual currencies should 
be regulated, but it is also clear that many countries still have yet to define what virtual 
currencies are and whether they may be deemed legal tender (among other peripheral issues) 
(Rooney, 2018). Such debates underscore the lack of political wherewithal necessary at this time 
to grasp all of the implications of a virtual currency sector that shows no signs of slowing down. 
Fortunately, the EBA recognized the shortcomings of its own analysis and called for the EU to 
take action in formulating a consistent regulatory response. The EBA’s report concludes: 
“With regard to national supervisory authorities, the aim of the  
Opinion is to build a common supervisory culture and practice  
across the European Union, and ensure there are uniform procedures 
and consistent approaches throughout. These form part of the  
EBA’s regulatory response by seeking to put in place appropriate  
supervisory (and, in the long term, regulatory) practices in relation 
to virtual currencies, insofar as this falls within the competence of  
national authorities. Given that the regulatory environment for VCs  
is undeveloped, an EBA Opinion is an appropriate tool on which  
guidelines or recommendations could be built at a later stage,  
should a more comprehensive regime be developed in European 
Union law” (EBA, 2013).  
 It would take another four years for the EU to begin mobilizing behind an appropriate 
regulatory response to the EBA’s report, but that response eventually came in the form of the 
European Commission’s (EC) first ever Supranational Risk Assessment Report. Released in June 
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2017, the 20-page report (and its corresponding 300-page annex) touches on every possible 
money laundering-related risk to the EU along with associated terrorism financing schemes. 
Given the comprehensive nature Supranational Risk Assessment Report, it is unsurprising that 
one of its key portions highlights issues with virtual currency regulation. Echoing the EBA’s 
report with even more specificity, the EC explicitly noted that the most substantial Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (AMLD) issued by the EU remained an inadequate platform for combating 
virtual currency manipulation (European Commission, 2017). According to the EC, the biggest 
issue facing regulators is the difficulty of tracking virtual currency transactions and users: 
“[Virtual currency] risk levels differ compared to cash transactions because they require more 
sophisticated planning, cover lower volumes of transactions and may be subject to a certain level 
of monitoring. However, their anonymity features place an intrinsic limitation on identification 
and monitoring possibilities” (Ibid., 2017). 
 Most importantly, the EC’s report attempted to quantify the extent to which virtual 
currencies were implicated in the contemporary European financial marketplace. Per the Annex 
of the EC’s risk assessment, estimates were provided regarding key figures such as the number 
of virtual currency users in the EU, the number of exchange platforms, and virtual currency 
market capitalization (using 2014-2015 estimates): 
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The preliminary figures alone highlight the shortcomings of any attempt to regulate and 
monitor virtual currencies. Per Investing.com’s most recent figures, there is enough to suggest 
that the calculations provided by the EC just two years ago dramatically understate the 
proliferation of virtual currencies not just in the EU, but worldwide (Investing.com, 2019). Given 
the EU’s importance to the global economy, its sheer size, and the notable money laundering 
issues that faced more traditional financial institutions in recent years, it is unlikely that only 7 
billion EUR of virtual currency market capitalization exists in the EU. Furthermore, if one 
examines the figures provided for virtual currency wallets worldwide, with wallets serving as a 
third-party storage mechanism for holding and administrating virtual currency accounts, the mere 
presumption that virtual currency wallet totals doubled within one year is far more emblematic of 
the scale with which these technologies continue to grow. The EC’s report can be faulted for 
inadvertently yet dramatically underselling the potential danger of virtual currencies in Europe; 
nonetheless, its subsequent recommendation calling for greater virtual currency regulation was 
instrumental in pushing the entire transnational bloc to take more active steps in regulating the 
virtual currency sector.  
 Although it took four years and an extensive EC report for the EU to act upon the EBA’s 
prescient assessment, such a response finally emerged. The EU’s fourth AMLD did not reflect 
any of the concerns raised by the EBA, but after receiving the EC’s recommendation and facing 
vocal exhortations from European financial regulators and policy officials (such as International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) chief Christine Lagarde and EC Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis) who 
had become more aware of virtual currencies over time, the fifth iteration was bound to represent 
an important first step in managing virtual currency growth as a unified European front (Lagarde, 
2018; Dombrovskis, 2018).  
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II. Key Takeaways from the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
 On 19 June 2018, the European Parliament and Council of the European Union published 
its 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD), continuing the EU’s tradition of issuing 
periodic updates to the preexisting money laundering regulatory framework. Directives represent 
the second tier of EU regulatory policies, as they present certain outcomes that need to be 
achieved across the bloc while granting each member state some freedom in determining how to 
translate these initiatives into national laws with binding force (USDA Mission to the European 
Union, 2019). Upon first glance, the directive seems to be most focused on addressing the 
remediation of “Panama Papers”-related oversight failures, such as calling for a more rigorous 
assessment of legal entities for use in potential money laundering activities (EUR-Lex, 2018). 
However, the most important set of long-term provisions suggested expanding the scope of the 
AMLD to include:  
1) Virtual currency exchange platforms and similar entities as subject to EU regulations 
and oversight (much like investment banks and other major financial institutions); 
2) A request for member states to create central databases “comprised of virtual 
currency users’ identities and wallet addresses, as well as self-declaration forms 
submitted by virtual currency users” in order to better assess who is using these 
services; and  
3) The incorporation of key terms and regulatory definitions into the EU’s AML 
legislation. (Deloitte, 2018). 
The clearest command of the 5th AMLD (or 5AMLD as it is more commonly known 
within the regulatory sphere) is the need for greater collaboration both within the EU and across 
its partner entities (such as the United Nations, Interpol, and Europol) to tackle the “convergence 
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between organized crime and terrorism.” (EUR-Lex, 2018). With an eye to the increasing 
frequency of terrorist attacks in major European cities, this is not a surprising consideration 
(European Parliament, 2018). As a result, 5AMLD aims to incorporate broader coverage of 
financial technologies such as (but not limited to) virtual currencies as part of a more holistic 
AML regulatory policy. 5AMLD states: 
“Providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies 
and fiat currencies (that is to say coins and banknotes that are designated 
as legal tender and electronic money, of a country, accepted as a medium 
of exchange in the issuing country) as well as custodian wallet providers 
are under no Union obligation to identify suspicious activity. Therefore,  
terrorist groups may be able to transfer money into the Union financial  
system or within virtual currency networks by concealing transfers or  
by benefiting from a certain degree of anonymity on those platforms. 
It is therefore essential to extend the scope of [the previous AMLD] so 
as to include providers engaged in exchange services between virtual  
currencies and fiat currencies as well as custodian wallet providers.  
For the purposes of anti-money laundering and countering the financing  
of terrorism (AML/CFT), competent authorities should be able, through 
obliged entities, to monitor the use of virtual currencies” (EUR-Lex, 2018). 
By including such explicit AML-related language with respect to virtual currencies, the EU 
offered as clear an indication as possible that it recognized the need for a more robust approach 
to addressing money laundering concerns implicated by virtual currencies. Moreover, the 
language of the directive goes on to empower “competent authorities” serving in a supervisory 
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capacity to meet the aims of 5AMLD by sharing confidential information without the fear of 
“legal uncertainty which may stem from a lack of explicit provisions in this field” (Ibid., 2018).  
One notable tension in 5AMLD’s language is that it seeks to strike a balance between 
calling for more transparency in all forms of financial regulation and aiming to protect the 
privacy of individuals implicated in these new provisions against the backdrop of “fundamental 
rights.” In an extremely telling passage, the European Parliament and Council take great pains to 
couch its regulations in data privacy considerations, noting, “a fair balance should be sought in 
particular between the general public interest in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing and the data subjects’ fundamental rights. The set of data to be made available to the 
public should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so 
as to minimize the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners. At the same time, information 
made accessible to the public should not significantly differ from the data currently collected” 
(Ibid., 2018). With a particular focus on virtual currencies, it cannot be denied that part of their 
appeal is the somewhat democratic nature of their use and expansion. Virtual currencies do not 
require opening a formal bank account with a local branch of a non-descript traditional financial 
institution, and virtual currencies’ instant accessibility for anyone with a computer and the ability 
to process such transactions has opened up a new way to access and transfer capital. Perhaps 
implicitly, this language seeks to balance the need for regulation with the desire to remain true to 
the general cause of freedom and individual rights that undergird the entire European 
experiment.  
With that said, the 5AMLD outlines broad strokes for member states to incorporate into 
their national laws by 2020, and such freedom suggests that there will be some variance in 
member state regulation as each national government determines the approach to implementation 
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that works best. Given the general nature of the European Parliament and Council’s 
recommendations, it remains to be seen how potent member states’ responses to the need for 
virtual currency regulation will be when compared to confronting more pressing and wide-
ranging issues with traditional financial institutions. Consider that in the last twelve months 
alone, the EU has been roiled by controversies stemming from malfeasant banks and individuals 
involved in elaborate money laundering activities. Some of the most widely publicized stories 
include Danske Bank’s issues with money laundering in its Estonian branches, ABLV Bank’s 
assistance with laundering illicit funds into North Korea, and the implication of a senior 
European Central Bank official in multiple money laundering schemes (Deslandes et al., 2018; 
Milne and Binham, 2018; Piovano, 2018). The clear challenges in managing financial actors that 
are already highly regulated and extremely attentive to money laundering issues demonstrates the 
uphill battle EU member states face in developing and implementing the requisite platforms for 
competently overseeing a fragmented and clandestine virtual currency market.  
After five years of research and analysis into the virtual currency market, the EU 
implemented its 5th AMLD representing yet another milestone in collaboration among EU 
institutions. There is reason to be optimistic about the future of virtual currency regulation in 
Europe, but this directive simply represents a foundational step in creating the necessary 
platform for engaging with a complicated and diffuse financial services sphere. It should be 
noted that with the release of the 6th AMLD in late October 2018, the EU has doubled down on 
its commitment to stop money laundering activities in the form of virtual currencies, bolstering 
its approach with provisions that call for tougher punishments and criminal sanctions for bad 
actors (Deloitte, 2019). With the power to impose punitive measures on individuals and 
institutions found engaging in these illicit activities, the next step is creating measures that 
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recognize the challenges of regular oversight yet attempt to deter as much malfeasance as 
possible. Crucially, 5AMLD prioritizes efforts that bring virtual currency transactions into the 
light by calling for registration and other forms of minimizing the anonymity these platforms 
currently enjoy. Moving forward, the success or failure of this directive will hinge on curtailing 
the next tier of challenges that such a project presents.   
III. Notable Shortcomings and Assessing the Future of Virtual Currency Regulation 
 Money laundering regulations have been a mainstay of the global financial system for 
decades, particularly as reduced barriers to cross-border trade and rapid technological 
advancements increase market access for sophisticated parties wishing to access new markets. 
Although most financial transactions are lawful and legitimate, reflecting socially desirable 
activities such as investments in companies, risk mitigation efforts, or personal wealth 
management, there are also clandestine efforts to transfer funds into illicit activities. The IMF 
eloquently summarizes why money laundering is so problematic in a globalized economy, 
noting: 
“Money laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial  
Crimes with economic effects. Money laundering requires an  
underlying, primary, profit-making crime (such as corruption,  
drug trafficking, market manipulation, fraud, tax evasion), along 
with the intent to conceal the proceeds of the crime or to further 
the criminal enterprise. These activities generate financial flows 
that involve the diversion of resources away from economically 
and socially-productive uses—and these diversions can have  
negative impacts on the financial sector and external stability  
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of member states. They also have a corrosive, corrupting effect 
on society and the economic system as a whole” (IMF, 2019).  
 The IMF’s reflection on money laundering and its pernicious effects also alludes to the 
dangers of money laundering if left unchecked within democratic states. In an article for Project 
Syndicate, Oxford-based scholar Ngaire Woods highlighted the issues with increasing income 
inequality in developed countries and noted how scandals like the “Panama Papers” leak 
undermined trust in democratic institutions (Woods, 2016). Her concerns are well-founded: if it 
is believed that certain (often well-heeled) interests are improperly taking advantage of a system 
that everyone is expected to follow, then resentment will unsurprisingly mount among those 
members of society who will never be able to attain the sort of wealth and access that might 
embolden certain parties to flout the established order in the first place. One of the most notable 
takeaways of the EU’s increasing body of research on virtual currencies is that not many people 
possess them relative to the size of the market, but it also creates a long-term risk that virtual 
currencies will become viewed not as a democratic platform, but as a tool for the elite to funnel 
funds into less than savory activities at their discretion. One economist claimed that 
cryptocurrencies in particular are “a toy for a very narrow segment of investors,” suggesting that 
concerns about their impact on the real economy are unfounded (Zhao, 2017). Yet it is for that 
reason that virtual currencies should give observers pause, as public opinion could easily turn 
against them if they are beset by scandals implicating the stability of the global financial system 
as a whole. 
This brief examination of virtual currencies and the risks of unfettered money laundering 
schemes on democratic stability is just one potential shortcoming of the current AML regime 
within the EU. As has been repeatedly asserted, 5AMLD outlines the contours of a potentially 
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powerful virtual currency regulation platform that can serve as an example for other countries to 
follow (especially in the absence of coherent cross-border coordination regarding virtual 
currency management). However, there are several challenges that become evident as one moves 
from high-level policy advisory to grassroots implementation, including the following 
considerations: 
1) There remains a high risk of coordination problems with other influential governance 
regimes, particularly the United States (which has steadily looked inward as reflected 
by the current president’s governing mandate) and China (where the EC’s risk 
assessment suggests most virtual currency mining in the world is currently taking 
place) (EC, 2017). The EU recognizes that most virtual currency activity happens 
outside the EU, but as the connective tissue between several key economic markets, 
this is unlikely to remain true over time. As a result, the EU must enlist support from 
similarly impacted actors if it hopes to cover all of the potential transactions that may 
pass through its borders.  
2) EU member states must individually determine the best way to incorporate the broad 
aims of 5AMLD into national law, but this may result in a wide range of differing 
policies that “converge” for the purposes of EU regulation. As a result, such 
discrepancies in national policy may reveal gaps in certain countries’ AML 
infrastructure that may render them more vulnerable than others to virtual currency 
laundering schemes.  
3) Few individuals use virtual currencies relative to the size of the market, and it can be 
assumed that most of the market capitalization is tied up in a handful of stakes that, if 
exposed, would make the early iteration of this regulatory regime much easier to 
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execute. With that said, the process of uncovering these parties (especially if they do 
not want to be known) is far easier to envisage on paper than in reality.  
4) It may be the case that couching virtual currency regulation in terrorism concerns is 
the best way to elicit buy-in from key stakeholders, but it also severely 
underestimates the problem that money laundering through virtual currencies 
presents. Just as with the “Panama Papers” scandal, it is more likely than not that 
wealthy interests seeking to take advantage of a lax regime will be far better 
positioned to use virtual currencies in illicit ways than terrorist networks (at least at 
this stage of virtual currencies’ growth and evolution). For that reason, the same 
protections recommended in order to shield the financial system from offshore 
accounts, shell companies, and other entities likely to be leveraged by elites must also 
be incorporated into a sound and forward-thinking virtual currency regulation 
scheme.  
5) Perhaps the greatest challenge will be creating strong mechanisms for sifting through 
virtual currency transactions and differentiating innocuous transfers from illicit ones. 
With the rise of virtual currency transactions for everything from currency conversion 
to remittances, it will be harder to tell whether a transaction is permissible or illegal, 
and this monitoring process will require a higher level of sophistication than what 
currently exists for more traditional financial instruments.  
6) 5AMLD also demonstrates the challenges of defining what exactly should be covered 
under “virtual currencies” for the purposes of comprehensive regulation, and although 
the directive aims to cover “all the potential uses of virtual currencies,” a sound 
policy must pinpoint those uses that move the needle in terms of potential money 
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laundering schemes and tackle those products first before moving to more fringe 
services.  
The above considerations may raise healthy skepticism about the future of virtual 
currency regulation in the near-term, but the EU has nonetheless offered an important foundation 
for issuing protections against threats posed by a rapidly-growing and extremely unpredictable 
virtual currency marketplace. As the European Parliament and Council prudently assert in 
5AMLD, it will be crucial to balance the need for regulation and protecting users’ privacy and 
freedom to transact in the process, and it is this consideration that reflects the EU’s overarching 
emphasis on democratic growth. But as stories regarding failed money laundering schemes with 
virtual currencies increase, public scrutiny regarding virtual currency use will increase in turn, 
and the early policymaking efforts of EU member states to build in platforms that can combat 
illicit money transfers will speak favorably on behalf of the EU’s effort to establish 
accountability at a time when faith in democratic institutions is as lackluster as ever (Khatri, 
2019; Partz, 2019).  
As the G20 and other multilateral institutions begin to prioritize virtual currency 
regulation, the outlook for regulating these poorly understood financial instruments should 
remain positive. Given the EU’s proactive regulatory shifts in this domain, and its outsized stake 
in managing potential risks within the marketplace, it is likely that Europe and European 
institutions will lead the charge in shaping virtual currency regulation regimes for years to come 
(Canepa, 2018).  
 
  
